Cambodia’s Democracy: Prospect and Challenges

Deth Sok Udom¹

Since achieving independence from French colonial control in 1953, Cambodia has experienced several (usually bloody) regime changes, namely a constitutional monarchy (1953-1970), a U.S.-backed right-wing republic (1970-1975), a genocidal communist regime (1975-1979), a Vietnamese-controlled socialist republic (1979-1989), a reformed State of Cambodia (1989-1991), a UN-supervised transitional state (1992-1993), and once again a constitutional monarchy (1993-present). The prolonged period of internal conflicts and the Cold War resulted in national destruction and dealt a serious blow to democracy in Cambodia, most notably during the communist Khmer Rouge regime (formally known as “Democratic Kampuchea”).

The end of the Cold War and the eventual collapse of communist regimes around the world brought new hopes to the Cambodian people. The Paris Peace Agreements, signed in October 1991, committed all the major Cambodian fighting factions to a ceasefire and paved the way for the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). UNTAC was responsible for supervising a UN-sponsored national election in 1993 – the first relatively free and fair election in the country since Cambodia’s independence. Almost 90% of eligible Cambodian voters turned out to cast their ballots. Despite some flaws, a multi-party democratic system was reborn in Cambodia. With the opening of the country and support from international donors in the 1990s, civil society and independent media organizations thrived afterward.

In the subsequent national elections of 1998, 2003, and 2008, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) under Prime Minister Hun Sen managed to win an increasing number of parliamentary seats. This was in part due to the CPP’s firm control over bureaucratic resources and media channels, as well as an established patronage network, but also because the party was credited with bringing peace, stability and economic growth to the country. Albeit not a free or fair election, at its peak, the CPP won 90 out of 123 seats in the 2008 election, making it the dominant political party in Cambodia. In the 2013 election, however, the CPP faced a serious challenge when two main opposition parties united to form the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP). By utilizing social media platforms (especially Facebook) to highlight the issues of prevailing corruption, injustice, poverty, environmental degradation and other socio-economic problems to appeal to voters, the CNRP actually came close to winning the election. While the official results showed that the CPP won with a 68-55 seats split, the opposition party alleged electoral fraud and irregularities, refused to recognize the results and demanded re-election. Street protests by supporters of the opposition continued for several months calling for Hun Sen to step down. The demonstration eventually lost its steam and was cracked down, forcing the opposition party to cave in and accept the results in exchange for the government’s agreement to reform the National Election Committee, share power in the parliamentary committees, and grant licenses for the opposition party’s TV and radio stations (although this last promise did not materialize).

After a brief period of the so-called “culture of dialogue” between the CPP and the CNRP leaders, a series of events have marked the serious decline of democracy in Cambodia. In July 2015, Kem Ley, a popular and widely-respected political analyst was gunned down in broad daylight. A gunman who claimed his name to be “Choup Somlab” (literally meaning “Meet to Kill”) was immediately arrested and confessed to killing Kem Ley over unresolved debt. Few people, if any, find the story credible. The assassination of Kem Ley sent a chilling message to government critics and has had the effect of narrowing the space of political expressions and increased self-censorship in the country. In late 2017, the CNRP (the only major opposition party in the country) was dissolved by the Supreme Court being charged with attempting to overthrow the government through a color revolution. Competing with only a number of smaller parties, the CPP won all the contested seats in the 2018 national election, effectively making Cambodia a one-party state with the CPP’s total control over the 125-seat National Assembly. Having ruled Cambodia as prime minister since 1985, Hun Sen is currently one of the world’s longest-serving leaders and has recently declared that he would continue to rule until he no longer wanted to.

The current Covid-19 pandemic has had the effect of curtailing democratic space even further in Cambodia, especially as political activities or mass gatherings are not permitted and online dissent comes under closer scrutiny and targeted. Yet, while politically stable (or at least appearing to be so for now), Cambodia under the CPP is currently encountering a twin set of economic challenges posed by the partial removal of the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) trade scheme over issues of human rights and democratic backsliding as well as the lingering impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on Cambodia’s economy across various sectors. If prolonged much further, an economic downturn could become a recipe for social and political unrest in the years to come.

Given these factors, what can be expected of the future of democracy in Cambodia? In the foreseeable future, it appears unlikely that a strong opposition party could make a comeback in the Cambodian political scene (despite the establishment of a number of political parties by ex-opposition members to compete in the 2023 national election), especially as the international community continues to be preoccupied by the Covid-19 pandemic and its derailing impacts on the global economy. The ongoing challenges and tragedy of the people in Myanmar in their current struggle against the military is a testimony to this predicament. In fact, even before the pandemic, there had been already a plethora of democratic backsliding across the globe which went hand in hand with the apparent rise of populist politics even in places where multi-party democracy is alive and well.

Whatever the case, Cambodia’s hope for democracy hinges upon the new generation of Cambodians, both among the political elite and the general population. As the memory of war is gradually disappearing, the old political way of relying on warmongering or threat of violence will not appeal to or easily scare off the younger generation of voters who will demand improved public services, wider economic opportunities, and more open political space. As of this writing, the heart of Cambodia’s liberal democracy may not be found on the floor of the Parliament but it is continuing to beat (however lightly or slowly) through the veins of civil society organizations, independent media stations, and is still most visible on social media platforms whereby government’s actions and policies are monitored, challenged, or appreciated by the citizens. As long as these critical voices can still be heard and so long as there is still public demand and continued international support for such voices, the hope for a revival of Cambodia’s liberal democracy is not completely lost.