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Characteristics and Aspects of Democratization Movement in Myanmar

Joon-Young Jang
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

1. Birth of Myanmar’s Democracy and Mismanagement of National Affairs

System Reality
Parliamentary democracy (UK) Pursue socialism (Socialistic economy policy)
Buddhist socialism driven by Prime Minister
Separatist movement of ethnic minorities
Failure to read the changing social environment and prepare countermeasures
Reliance on the military
Book published by the military as they returned to barracks

Is Trust Vindicated?(1960)
Myanmar gained independence from the UK on January 4, 1948. However, the absence of leadership resulted in a failure in managing the modern state efficiently. Prime Minister U Nu pursued the combination of politics and religion (Buddhism), and probably sought a return to a dynasty. Back then, ethnic minorities sought to strengthen their identity in Myanmar. Armed rebels with different ideologies were active, and the domestic commerce was dominated by the British and Indians. Prime Minister U Nu introduced a Buddhist economy which combined Buddhism and economy, and adopted policies prioritizing distribution and welfare over growth.

However, these policies were executed without setting targets to achieve, and the failure to appropriately respond to the international price of rice in relation to production and export, which was the main source of government income, resulted in a shortage of tax revenue. Above all, state administration was made difficult by armed rebels active across the country. Prime Minister U Nu made unreasonable behaviors, such as becoming a monk or seeking a shaman's prediction for the future of the country.

Eventually, in 1958, a military transitional government led by Ne Win was inaugurated and made a considerable contribution to restoring the law and order during its regency that lasted 18 months. The military regime garnered strong public support until then.


2. Since 1962, the military rule in Myanmar resulted in the worst outcome, the failure of the state

• Legacies of the Military Rule that Lasted Half a Century
Transition to socialistic, planned economy
→ The military managed and operated the national wealth
The military’s economic activities
→ Obstruct the formation of a healthy market, predator of the national economy
Bureaucracy filled with the military
→ Lack of professionalism, discontinuity of work, failure of state administration
Voluntary isolation from the international community
→ No opportunities to learn international standards, suspended exchanges
Repression of ethnic minorities
→ Reinforce the presence of the military, create disputes among people
Failure of the state, let alone the government
Least Developed Country(Dec.1987/UN)
The military regime pointed out the economic structure of Myanmar as the biggest failure of the civilian government. Accordingly, it declared a transition to a strong socialistic, planned economy and pushed head with the nationalization of all private properties, which would then be managed the bureaucracy. As soon as it announced the introduction of a planned economy system, the whole country turned into a huge black market, which means Myanmar was already close to a market economy.

The military started economic activities in the late 1950s, which were later substantially expanded under the military regime. Previously, they had run small businesses for the self-reliance of soldiers and the welfare of their families. However, under the socialistic economy system, state-run companies were established and later they were controlled and managed by the military. In addition, private companies in partnership with those state-run companies were often managed by the military and their families, thus creating a huge military cartel. Even though the socialistic, planned economy system was abolished after 1988, the military established two companies which have monopolized the domestic infrastructure and food industries. In fact, it is more appropriate to say Myanmar’s military is an interest group which makes profit through economic activities, rather than focusing on national defense.

Ne Win, who mounted the coup, did not recognize the U Nu regime and particularly he criticized the incompetence of civilian officials. He perceived the civilian officials as the legacy of the colonial era, so they were all dismissed and replaced by the military, who however could not maintain professionalism and continuity of work as before. Moral hazard was prevalent as the military manipulated statistics and deceived their job performance in a bid to please and butter up their superiors. Myanmar became a military state, where bureaucracy was filled with the military.

Burmese socialism promoted by Ne Win is characterized by the combination of religion and politics, rather than separation from religion. What is more, it completely closed off exchanges with foreign countries while seeking to promote self-reliance. Ne Win insisted it was the way to protect Myanmar from the risk of colonization and not seek to colonize other countries, but in fact it was a very radical and absurd policy. Myanmar’s voluntary isolation in the international community resulted in closing down the window of communication between the general public, let alone the bureaucracy, and the outside world.

The military mobilized troops and weapons in dealing with the armed forces of ethnic minorities. Several rounds of peace talks ended up in rupture as they did not trust each other. The ethnic minorities moved back and forth between solidarity and division, but ultimately they were not capable of confronting the military. At that time, people in Myanmar were not quite interested in the issues of the ethnic minorities, and the military regime’s policy of promoting “division” fostered a public perception of “us vs. enemies”.


3. Characteristics of the Anti-government Protests / Characteristics of Democratization Activists (1988-2010)

Under the tyranny of the military regime, however, there were several anti-government protests in Myanmar's modern history; protest by university students on July 7, 1962, conflict with the military over the funeral of former UN Secretary-General Wu Tan in 1974, Spring of Rangoon from March to August, 1988 which is also called 8888, anti-government protest by monks in 2007, and public resistance to the military coup in 2021. The content and nature of their democratization movement have evolved over time, but several chronic problems have been observed.

People in Myanmar did not have sufficient opportunities to learn the trends of the international community and democracy, and hence they do not clearly understand democracy and tensions arise in the course of promoting democracy in the country. People in Myanmar insist that they have their own historical background and cultural pluralism and hence their democracy cannot always be in sink with the international context, which Aung San Suu Kyi has also mentioned several times. It will be sometime until they can understand that democracy should not be affected by any ideologies or national context.

In Myanmar culture, they have a belief that the head or leader of a group make a lot of achievements, and hence some people, particularly men, took advantage of democratization movement as a chance of making a mark. Between 1990 and 2010, Myanmar’s democratization protests were staged mostly outside the country but ended up with no result, as those overseas activities played no part during the Saffron Revolution in 2007. Rather, they focused more on earning reputations for themselves and their organizations, and securing financial support to fund their activities. Over time, the democratization movement has become a way of making a living. Most of the democratic activists from that time have not returned to Myanmar after 2010.

All public protests have failed under the military rule. The memory of defeat has become a deeply rooted sense of failure among the people. People in the middle class or above, who are close to or on the side of the military, held a neutral position during national crises but then kept changing their stance depending on who was winning in confrontations. As we saw in 2021, people in their 40s or older have rarely participated in the protests. They witnessed firsthand the cruelty of the military and have the prevailing feeling that they cannot overcome the military on their own. As also seen in 2007, the Myanmarese show the tendency not to resist the regime unless their livelihood is threatened.


4. Pitfalls of the Military-led Regime Change

• Normal regime change: top-down transformation
Opening-up (divisions within a regime, resistance from cilvil society
Transformation or transition (conflict vetween hardliners vs. reformers within the regime, victory of civil society)
Stablization (introduce/implement democratic systems, the rule of law to ensure no chances of return)
• Regime change in Myanmar
Transformation or transition (power transfer without conflicts within the military, no involvement from opposition parties and civil society)
Opening up (politics, economy)
Guaranteed interests of the military, Possible regression of democracy
The reform and open-up policies led by the military regime since 2011 involved many uncertainties, and the dominant view of the media was that the regime change meant the democratization of Myanmar. However, Myanmar’s political status was vulnerable to regression at any event. In general, the collapse of a non-democratic government starts when it is challenged by civil society. After a regime change, a strong civil society serves to check or criticize the regime, thereby contributing to sound political development.

In Myanmar, however, the regime change was led by the military, with no involvement of opposition parties or civil society. In other words, the military virtually entrusted their political power to the civilian or semi-civilian government, and left open the possibility that they will overturn the political system if their authority or functions are reduced. As a result, civil society did not develop in Myanmar after the regime change, and the civilian government failed to find ways to send the military back to the barracks by checking, persuading or cooperating with the military depending on situations.


5. Democratization without Democracy (2010~)

• Two bodies of authorities
Democratic Camp: pursue civilian authoritarianism
  • Blind loyalty to Aung San Suu kyi
  • Aung San Suu Kyi’s arbitrary state management and inexperience
  • Failure of inclusive policy toward ethnic minorities
  • Little result of economic development
The Military: maintain military authoritarianism
  • Vested economic interests
  • Presence through conflicts with ethnic minorities
  • Solidarity within the military leadership
People
  • Blind belief in Aung San Suu Kyi
  • Criticism of the democratic camp = pro-military
  • indifference to the military’s oppression of ethinic minorities
  • Division and tension among ethnic minorities
  • Military supporters, informant (village leader, bureaucrat)
It is fair to say that the “Democratization of Myanmar without democracy” is a phrase criticizing the Aung San Suu Kyi government, as well as reflecting the aftermath of protracted military rule. In 2016, a democratic government led by Aung San Suu Kyi was launched and ministers and major politicians who came back to the political scene shared a firm stance against the military regime as they had long been placed under arrest. However, they considered loyalty to Aung San Suu Kyi as the most important political belief and hence how they would protect and develop democracy remained questionable.

Aung San Suu Kyi's dogmatism and self-righteousness reached their peak. She established the position of State Advisor as a super-constitutional body and got herself the position higher than the President. Most importantly, she had promised to push ahead with a federal system based on national unity and autonomy, but did not actually implement any policies for that matter. In general elections in 2015 and 2020, the NLD failed to win support from ethnic minorities, and particularly came under criticism that it condoned and aided the military’s genocide of the Rohingja.

The military continued to show its presence enjoying vested economic interest and causing conflicts with ethnic minorities, and maintained their role and position as an influential political group. They formed one of two political groups competing with each other in the country, and the other was the new political authorities in the name of a democratic camp, led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Basically, the civilian government had no control over the military. As the military regime had been in power for too long, even those who suggest constructive criticism about the democratic camp are often mistaken for being pro-military. Political compromise is never an easy journey.


6. Unexpected Results of the 2021 Coup

Take interest in ethnic minority issues
→ Pursue national unity, including the Rohingya
Realize the true nature of the military and withdraw public support
→ Challenge: how to spread the awareness among the middle class
Question blind support for the democratic camp and Aung San Suu Kyi
→ emergence of a new generation (MZ generation)
Spread awareness of the need to promote democratization at home rather than abroad
Public resistance to the military coup in 2021 is still ongoing, and how it will end draws attention. There are new aspects about these demonstrations different from past protests, which may be a green light to Myanmar’s democracy movement in the future. The National Unification Government (NUG), launched in April 2021, announced that it would aim to achieve the unification of federation members, whereby NUG sought to draw support from ethnic minorities. In addition to such a political purpose, efforts have been made by the public to take interest in the problems of ethnic minorities, including Rohingjas, who were marginalized within the federation, and to correct education distorted by the military government.

The younger generation started to criticize the blind belief about Aung San Suu Kyi that she represents absolute truth and is an impeccable stateswoman. As a matter of fact, people’s satisfaction with economic growth and regime was higher under the military regime which took the rein from 2011 to 2015, than under the government of Aung San Suu Kyi. The older generation may be content with Aung San Suu Kyi's political activities, but it is necessary that they should listen to the demands of the younger generation who wants new political leaders.

After Myanmar’s democratization uprising failed in 1988, democratic activists continued the movement abroad, and established a provisional government in Maryland, US in 1990. Yet, overseas movement for its democratization did not yield any results. At the outset of the coup in 2021, there were attempts to take the initiative of the democratization movement abroad again, particularly by the Myanmarese in the US. If past experience is any guide, democratization movement must start and develop within a country.


7. Myanmar’s Democracy, a Goal that Can’t be Given up

• Outpost of tranny: rogue state and destroyer of democracy (the US’s view)


Myanmar's democratization should not be viewed as just a domestic issue of one country. Myanmar was at loggerheads with the democratic world in the past, so much so that the Bush administration of the US called Myanmar a rogue state and an outpost of tyranny. Myanmar's reform and opening up began in 2011 and have since drawn the attention of the international community and attracted visits of prominent national leaders. At that time, the US pushed ahead with the pivot strategy and touted Myanmar’s geopolitical value. There were also views that changes in Myanmar could teach a lesson to the Korean Peninsula on its quest for peaceful future and that North Korea should follow in the footsteps of Myanmar's reform and opening up. Democracy has regressed across the world thereafter. The restoration of democracy in Myanmar can be a catalyst for democratization across Asia, including Southeast Asia, in addition to the primary objective of sending the military back to the barracks.